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Based on the analysis of managerial behavior, Jensen raised the "Free Cash 
Flow Hypothesis" in 1986. They supposed that, because of the agency cost between 
managers and shareholders, managers were able to use free cash flow to invest in 
excess. Insider control and tunnelling of major shareholders have been very serious 
in China's Listed Companies. It led to the widespread of over-investment behavior. 
Redundant construction is very serious, which bring about a waste of resources and 
low efficiency of investment. Over-investment behavior badly influenced the 
operating performance and business value, which would ultimately do harm to the 
interests of investors. Finally, it will be not conducive to the healthy development of 
economic. Thus, the study of over-investment behavior in China's Listed Companies 
has important theoretical and practical significance. 
In this paper, I refere to the research of Richardson in 2006. On the basis of 
expected rational investment model, I choose the companies, listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, to research investment behavior of China's listed 
companies over the causes, impact factors and governance mechanism. 
The study find that over-investment and free cash flow is positively correlated. 
Furthermore, compared with the negative free cash flow, the sensitive of 
investment-cash flow is much stronger for the positive free cash flow. As for the 
ultimate ownership, over-investment in private enterprises is the most serious, 
followed by the local government-controlled enterprises, and then the central 
government-controlled enterprise. In addition, relationship between over-investment 
and the first largest shareholder equity ratio is of "U"-type. On the contray, the 
relationship between over-investment and ownership dispersion ratio is of the 
inverted "U"-type. In the same time, I also found that over-investment are negatively 
related to management shareholding ratio and cash dividends. It reveals that they are 
both effective in inhibiting the over-investment behavior of listed companies. On the 















demenstrates that liabilities play a certain role on the governance of over-investment 
behavior of China’s listed companies. However, the result is instability. Meanwhile, 
over-investment and short-term debt ratio are negatively correlated. However, the 
relationship between over-investment and long-term debt ratio is of the inverted 
"U"-type. 
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表 1.1 中国投资率汇总表           单位：亿元 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
总投资 32918 37213 43500 55567 70477 88774 109998 137324
GDP 98000 108068 119096 135174 159587 184089 213132 251483
投资率 33.59% 34.44% 36.53% 41.11% 44.16% 48.22% 51.61% 54.61%
数据来源：国家统计局网站 
 
我国近年来的投资率一直居高不下，由表 1.1 可知，自 2000 年以来，我国
经济高速发展，投资率（总投资占 GDP 的比重）持续上升，从 2000 年的 33.59%
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